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Brown and Guan: Click to Accept (You Now Have No Rights!)

CLICK TO ACCEPT (YOU NOW HAVE NO
RIGHTS!)
Jason T. Brown *&Zifian Guan**
I. INTRODUCTION

Thanks to advances in technology with the simple touch of your
phone and a click of "I accept," you may have signed away your rights
to sue and much more. The emerging trend for companies is to inundate
the consumer with pages of language that they know people just don't
read which compels them to click "accept" to proceed and laugh with the
greed of corporate villainy as the rights to bring a lawsuit in court are
compromised, and the rights to bring a class action extinguished.
Corporate accountability has clandestinely evaporated with the stroke of
the mighty Supreme Court pen in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion'
and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.2 In both cases, the Supreme
Court held that contractual waiver of class arbitration were not
unconscionable, thereby ostensibly and effectively barring entry into
court and killing most class actions.
Class actions provide a collective mechanism for individuals to
vindicate their rights when individual actions would be cost prohibitive.
For example, if a utility company is knowingly overcharging a million
consumers a quarter a month and the statute has a six year look back, the
individual consumer has a case worth roughly $18 in actual damages,
and maybe with a nice punitive mechanism another $36, for a grand total
of $54. The costs of prosecuting the action will far exceed the potential
recovery, but as a conservative figure, assume there will be $10 million
in costs after a few depositions, other discovery costs, and expert costs,
especially if the company digs in and refuses to settle. The company
* Jason T. Brown is a seasoned attorney and heads the JTB Law Group, LLC. He
represents Plaintiffs nationwide in Labor based class actions and mass torts.
** Zijian Guan is an associate of the JTB Law Group, LLC, and works primarily on wage
and hour class action suits and mass tort matters.
1. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
3. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2304.
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may spend a hundred thousand or more dollars defending a $54 claim to
create a deterrent effect. Plaintiff s counsel has just invested forty times
the possible recovery in costs, a hundred thousand in fees and at the end
of the day, and the arbitrator, will look at the disproportion of the fee to
the recovery and hack away at any fee petition and possibly the
expenses. Most logical people will conclude the process is cost
prohibitive, so a complaint of this manner is usually dead on arrival.
However, if in the example above a million individuals are affected
and the claims can be aggregated, then damages under the statute could
be $54 million. The company will robustly defend, but it is a beneficial
economy of scale to all parties to consolidate the litigation as the
operative set of facts and law can be litigated in one action rather than
piecemeal. The consumers can obtain counsel to address their concerns
and companies can more economically and efficiently defend the matter
in its entirety. It's only fair that there is a day in Court, or perhaps a day
in Arbitration, to globally address the unlawful practice.
If you want to read any further in this article, you are hereby
revoking your rights to ever sue me, to bring a class or collective action
against me, and you must name your next child after my alter-ego JB,
aka SuperLawDude.
Sounds goofy, correct?
But in a recent
modification of its arbitration agreement the credit card company Capital
One added a clause stating that "we may contact you in any manner we
choose," including calls, text messages, emails, faxes or a "personal
visit."
Since the decision in Concepcion came down, many courts have
been following the Supreme Court majority's track and granting motions
to compel individual arbitration. But, some courts have diverged from
Concepcion by going through great lengths to distinguish their fact
pattern legally and factually to retain jurisdiction over the matter, rather
than dispatching justice through a third party that often is paid by the
defendant. This article will outline the tentacles of Concepcion, how it is
trapping the unwitting into arbitration, killing class actions, and
highlight departures from it that still enable people to avail themselves
of the courts and vindicate their collective rights.
II. AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION
The Supreme Court majority pronounced in Concepcion that the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") "makes agreements to arbitrate 'valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
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in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Almost everyone has a mobile phone nowadays, and has signed
some adhesion clause to activate its usage so the facts of Concepcion
could easily be applicable to you. In February 2002, Vincent and Liza
Concepcion ("the Concepcions") entered into a cellular telephone sale
and servicing agreement with AT&T (doing business at that time as
Cingular Wireless). The agreement provided that all disputes arising
between the parties should be arbitrated and brought in the parties'
"individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
"The agreement
purported class or representative proceeding."5
authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the
arbitration provision on several occasions." 6 The revised arbitration
provision that both parties admit controlled provided, inter alia, that "the
arbitratormay not consolidate more than one person's claims, and may
not otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class
proceeding."7 Hence, the revised agreement entered by the parties
mandates individual arbitration and expressly forbids aggregating
plaintiffs. It is known as a class arbitration waiver.
The Concepcions sued AT&T in March 2006 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California because they were
charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the retail value of the phones they
received for free. Later, the Concepcions' complaint was "consolidated
with a putative class action alleging, among other things, that AT&T had
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it
advertised as free." 9
Two (2) years after the Concepcions commenced the lawsuit,
10 The
AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement.
District Court denied AT&T's request primarily relying on the
California Supreme Court's decision in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court." In DiscoverBank, the California Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion
4.
5.

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (citing 9 U.S.C.
Id. at 1744 (emphasis added).

§2).

6. Id
7.
8.

Id. at 1744 n.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1744.

9. Id.
10. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CVl167DMS(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *2, *5
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Conception, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011).
11.

Id. at *7-14.
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in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then .. . the
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party 'from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person
or property of another.' Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not

be enforced. 12

This was referred to as the Discover Bank rule. The California
District Court found that the arbitration provision was unconscionable
because AT&T had not shown that individual arbitration was an
adequate substitute to address and deter the corporation from engaging
in the wrongful conduct. 13 To wit, an individual claim of $30.22
arbitrated individually, is not likely to have a company reconsider its
wrongful practice. The inverse is also true and without the class action
mechanism it is the consumer who would be deterred from bringing an
expensive action to recoup $30.22.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision on the
same grounds. 14 It also noted that the Discovery Bank rule was not
preempted by the FAA because the rule was "a refinement of the
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in
California."" Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected AT&T's contention that
"class proceedings will reduce the efficiency and expeditiousness of
arbitration."1 6
A. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion in Concepcion
The United States Supreme Court Concepcion majority asserted
that Section 2 of the FAA reflected both "a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration" and the "fundamental principle that arbitration is a

12.
Ann.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4" 148, 162-63 (2005) (citing Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1668).

13. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *14).
14. Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
15. Id. at 857.
16. Id. at 858 (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir.
2007).
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matter of contract."17 Further, it disfavored the California's Discovery
Bank rule, mentioning that "California courts have frequently applied
this rule to find arbitration agreements unconscionable" and that
"California's courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate
unconscionable than other contracts." 8
The Supreme Court majority based their decision on the following
two major grounds. "When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of
a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting
rule is displaced by the FAA."l 9 The Supreme Court noted that "a court
may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what ... the state legislature
cannot."' 20 To illustrate its point, the Court listed a few examples, such
as, "a case finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public
policy consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially
monitored discovery," "a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration
agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence," or "that
disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury." 21 The majority believed that
"the judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA had
manifested itself in 'a great variety' of 'devices and formulas' declaring
arbitration against public policy." 22 Hence, in their interpretation, a
finding that a class arbitration waiver is unconscionable is one of the
devices that "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's
objectives."23 In conclusion, the majority repeated that "[r]equiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA."24 The slight of hand here by the majority is how they reinforce
objectives of the FAA, but evaporate the letter of the law with class
actions. The traditional strict constructionists who comprised the
majority had to "read into" a statute to extinguish the mechanisms
provided outright in the letter of the law.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court through their opinion repeatedly
emphasized that "[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
1959)).
23.
24.

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
Id at 1746-47.
Id at 1747.
Id (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 n.9 (1987)).
Id
Id (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir.
Id. at 1748.
Id
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arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures
tailored to the type of dispute."25 Guided by Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., the Court made several observations of class
arbitration: "[c]lasswide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating
additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes;"
"[c]onfidentiality becomes more difficult;" and "arbitrators are not
generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of
certification, such as the protection of absent parties."2 6 In conclusion,
the "class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA."27
The Court further provided three reasons for reaching this
conclusion. "First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment." 2 8 Bilateral arbitration, in
contrast with class action litigation or class arbitration, is often chosen
by big consumer product and/or service providing companies as a
preferred method of resolving disputes arising out of the product or
service providing agreement. The majority believes bilateral arbitration
is more advantageous than class arbitration because "parties forgo the
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the
benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes."29
"Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality," for
example, "[fjor a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in
litigation, class representatives must at all times adequately represent
absent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class." 30 The Court
found "it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the
disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator." 3 ' Again,
the Court showing how it has read into a statute and desired to interpret
the FAA to trump any rights provided in class action mechanisms.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id at 1749.
Id. at 1750.; see also Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds Int'i Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
Id
Id. (citingStolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).
Id. at 1751.
Id.
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"Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants." 32
"[W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will
often become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a
devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into settling questionable
claims." 33 In this line of logic, the Court decided it is better to prejudice
the rights of the consumer rather than risk an error on a corporate
defendant.
The Supreme Court is saying since class arbitration manufactured
by the Discovery Bank rule is incompatible with the purpose of the FAA,
a waiver of class arbitration is inherently not unconscionable, and thus
the case should proceed to individual arbitration. However, does the
FAA anywhere on its face prohibit class arbitration? No. Do any of the
statutes that provide for class actions state on their face that they can be
bargained away or can be extinguished in arbitration? No. The
Supreme Court made interpretations of the FAA to extinguish long
standing statutory mechanisms and override the letter of the law, thereby
crushing consumer rights.
B. The Supreme CourtDissent in Concepcion
In contrast with the majority opinion's hostility towards the
Discovery Bank rule, the dissenting opinion observed objectively that
"[t]he Discover Bank rule does not create a blanket policy in California
against class action waivers in the consumer context" 34 and that "[c]ourts
applying California law have enforced class-action waivers where they
satisfy general unconscionability standards."35
The dissenting opinion reasoned that "[t]he Discover Bank rule is
consistent with the federal Act's language."36 The majority opinion
"linguistically" agrees that the rule falls "directly within the scope of the
Act's exception permitting courts to refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements on grounds that exist 'for the revocation of any contract."'37
"The Discover Bank rule is also consistent with the basic 'purpose

32. Id. at 1752.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1757 (dissenting opinion) (citing Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d. 1196,
1201 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

35.

Id.

36.
37.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing 9 U.S.C.
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behind' the Act."38 The primary purpose of the Act is to "secure the
'enforcement' of agreements to arbitrate."39 In Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, the Supreme Court rejected "the suggestion that the
overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims." 4 0 Hence, the dissenting opinion concluded that
judges "should think more than twice before invalidating a state law that
does just what § 2 requires, namely, puts agreements to arbitrate and
agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing."' 4 1 The majority actually
has gone further and elevated the agreement to arbitrate and
extinguished the rights to litigate for individuals and certainly to address
classwide complaints.
The dissenting opinion also rebutted that "the, Discover Bank rule
increases the complexity of arbitration procedures, thereby discouraging
parties from entering into arbitration agreements, and to that extent
discriminating in practice against arbitration."42
To begin with, "a state rule of law that would sometimes set aside
as unconscionable a contract term that forbids class arbitration is not (as
the majority claims) like a rule that would require 'ultimate disposition
by a jury' or 'judicially monitored discovery' or use of 'the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' 43 The American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
has found class arbitration to be "a fair, balanced, and efficient means of
resolving class disputes."44
Second, "even though contract defenses, e.g., duress and
unconscionability, slow down the dispute resolution process, federal
arbitration law normally leaves such matters to the States." 4 5 "California
is free to define unconscionability as it sees fit, and its common law is of
no federal concern so long as the State does not adopt a special rule that
disfavors arbitration."46
The dissenting opinion also asked a sharp and realistic question,
"[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a
$30.22 claim?" 4 7 Indeed, in reality, someone who spends tens of
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
Id. at 1758 (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221).
Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219 (1985).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758.
Id.
Id.

44.

Id.

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1760.
Id.
Id at 1761.
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thousands of dollars in expenses and hundreds of thousands in fees
chasing $30.22 while noble does not make good economic sense.
"Finally, the majority can find no meaningful support for its views
in this Court's precedent."4 8 The Supreme Court has not applied the
FAA to "strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with
49
The dissenting opinion
judicial and administrative proceedings."
arbitration agreement
an
criticized the majority opinion for elevating
over other forms of contract by immunizing it from judicial challenge on
grounds applicable to all other contracts.o
II.

DIVERGENCE FROM CONCEPCION

While the vast majority of Courts have followed Concepcion,
Courts all over the nation are wrestling with relinquishing jurisdiction
and creating unjust results which insulate corporations from
The troubled courts have found ways to evade
accountability.
Concepcion, and retain jurisdiction over matters thereby in some
instances vindicating the rights of the consumer.
In Noohi v. Toll Bros., the United States Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Maryland District Court's decision that the arbitration agreement in
dispute was unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration pursuant to
applicable Maryland law as articulated in Cheek v. UnitedHealthcareof
Mid-Atlantic, Inc.51 In Cheek, the arbitration policy between the plaintiff
employee and defendant employer "left to the employer the unilateral
right to 'alter, amend, modify, or revoke the [p]olicy at its sole and
52
The Court of
absolute discretion at any time with or without notice."'
as severable
agreement
arbitration
the
Appeals of Maryland "viewed
"that the
held
from the underlying employment relationship" and
employer's unfettered discretion to change the arbitration agreement
rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory, and that the agreement was
53
therefore unenforceable for lack of consideration."
In Noohi, the plaintiffs, who were prospective luxury home buyers,
brought a class action against the publicly traded real estate development
company, Toll Brothers, for refusal to return deposits after the plaintiffs

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50. Id (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967).
51. Noohi v Toll Bros. Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 603 (4th Cir. 2013); Cheek v. United Healthcare
of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 659 (Md. 2003).
52. Noohi, 708 F.3d at 606 (citing Cheek, 835 A.2d at 658).
53. Id at 606-07.
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could not obtain mortgage financing despite numerous good faith
attempts to obtain a loan.54 The total deposit was $77,008.00." The
arbitration provision at issue provides the following:
13. ARBITRATION: Buyer, on behalf of Buyer, and all
permanent residents on the Premises, including minor children,
hereby agree that any and all disputes with Seller .. . shall be
resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the rules and
procedures of Construction Arbitration Services, Inc. ("CAS")
or its successor or an equivalent organization mutually agreed
upon by the parties .... In addition, Buyer agrees that Buyer
may not initiate any arbitration proceeding for any Claim(s)
unless and until Buyer has first given Seller specific written
notice of each claim (at 250 Gibraltar Road, Horsham, PA
19044, Attn: Warranty Dispute Resolution) and given Seller a
reasonable opportunity after such notice to cure any default,
including the repair of the Premises in accordance with the
Home Warranty. The provisions of this paragraph shall be
governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. and shall survive settlement.
BUYER HEREBY WAIVES THE RIGHT TO A
PROCEEDING IN A COURT OF LAW (INCLUDING
WITHOUT LIMITATION A TRIAL BY JURY) FOR ANY
CLAIMS OR COUNTERCLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT
TO THIS AGREEMENT. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS
SECTION SHALL SURVIVE SETTLEMENT.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the provision
lacked mutual consideration since it can be altered at any point by the
defendants, and thus, was not enforceable." It is noticeable that this
arbitration provision was silent with respect to class arbitration.
In response to Toll Brothers' argument relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Concepcion, the Fourth Circuit differentiated Noohi
from Concepcion because the Maryland Cheek rule, unlike the
California Discover Bank rule, "neither increases formality nor risks to

54.

Id at 602-03.

55. Id. at 602.
56. Id at 609-10.
57. Id.at610.
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defendants."5 The Cheek rule "merely requires that for an arbitration
9
provision to be valid, both parties bind themselves to it." The Fourth
Circuit further noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has never held that the
FAA preempts state law rules requiring that arbitration provisions
themselves contain consideration (i.e., that they not be illusory), and it
would require a substantial extension of existing precedent to do so
here."60 In its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit, although acknowledging
the Supreme Court may eventually hold that the FAA preempts the
Cheek rule, cautioned that following Concepcion now would require an
61
extension of existing precedent and abrogation of their own laws. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, so an illusory clause can invalidate
arbitration in the Fourth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit itself parted from Concepcion as it struck down
62
an arbitration agreement in Smith v. Jem Group, Inc. on the grounds of
unconscionability. In Smith, the plaintiff filed a proposed class action
against debt-relief/settlement firms, "alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy, and breach of
Washington consumer protection statutes."6 3 In early April 2010, the
plaintiff signed a four-page attorney retainer agreement ("ARA")
between her and the debt relief/settlement law firm which contained an
"There was no
arbitration clause buried on the fourth page.
or the rest of the
ARA
the
in
either
clause
arbitration
the
explanation of
contract."65
Under the applicable Washington law, "a contractual provision is
6
An ARA is
unenforceable if it is procedurally unconscionable."
with the
complied
not
has
attorney
if
the
procedurally unconscionable
67
must
attorney
"An
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct.
provide a 'reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee
agreement' to the client."6 8 Specifically, "the Washington State Bar
Association ("WSBA") specified that an arbitration provision may be
included in an attorney fee agreement only if the attorney provides full

58. Id. at 612.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 613.
62. See Smith v. Jem Grp. 737 F.3d 636, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2013).
63. Id. at 639.
64. Id. at 638-39.
65. Id. at 639.
66. Id. at 640 (citing Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)).
67. Id. at 641.
68. Id. (citing Wash. Rules of Prof 1Conduct R. 1.59(a)(9)).
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disclosure of the provision to the client."69 Since there was no
explanation or disclosure of the arbitration provision to the client that
was buried in the fine print, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's
attorney did not comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct, and
thus, was procedurally unconscionable and thus unenforceable.
The defendants in Smith tried to argue that the Washington state
law, just like the California Discover Bank rule, was preempted by the
FAA. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument and
differentiated them from Concepcion on each and every ground: first,
the Washington law, unlike the California law, did not unduly burden
arbitration but only required attorneys to disclose the arbitration clause;o
second, the Washington law "is concerned only with the process that
results in the formation of the agreement" and, unlike the California law,
"says nothing about the manner in which an arbitration
is to be
conducted;"71 and finally, the Washington law is "not specifically aimed
at arbitration clauses" and only requires the attorneys to "disclose the
arbitration agreement only to the same degree that he or she must
disclose all material terms in an ARA."72
At the trial level in the Ninth Circuit, the Northern District of
California struck down an arbitration agreement in Trompeter v. Ally
Fin., Inc.73 In Trompeter, the arbitration agreement included a waiver of
class arbitration, like the one in Concepcion.74 The plaintiff did not
argue the waiver was unconscionable, but asserted that the arbitration
agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable
under the California law, Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court.75 Under
Arguelles-Romero, the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving that the arbitration provision is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable to establish the agreement is
unenforceable.7 The Northern District held "[w]hile the Supreme Court
has overturned California law requiring the availability of class-wide
relief in arbitration agreements, the Court has indicated that state law
bearing on contracts of adhesion remains good law." 77 The defendant
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
App. 4th
76.
77.

Id.
Id at 641-642.
Id at 642.
Id.
Trompeter v. Ally Financial, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 1070; AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
Trompeter, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-76; Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court, 184 Cal.
825, 836 (2010).
Trompeter, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; Arguelles-Romero, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 837.
Trompeter, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6).
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Ally tried to argue for its position relying on Concepcion, but the Court
observed that their reading of Concepcion was too broad and further
explained:
Concepcion does not preclude this Court's finding that the
arbitration agreement in the present case is unconscionable
because the finding does not undermine the fundamental
attributes of arbitration as an alternative form of dispute
resolution that is neutral, speedy, economical and informal. The
Court's review of the arbitration agreement applies the generally
applicable contract principle of unconscionability and, thus,
does not offend the FAA's policy objective favoring
18
arbitration.
Hence, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the
California general principle of unconscionability, and the plaintiffs
proposed class action continued in court for litigation, rather than being
forced into individual arbitration. Relying on general contract principle
of unconscionability, the plaintiff successfully threw out the arbitration
agreement.
The United States Third Circuit, post-Concepcion, allowed class
79
In Sutter, the
arbitration in Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC
Sutter, and
Dr.
plaintiff,
the
between
Agreement
Physician
Primary Care
arbitration
the
"neither
and
clause,
Oxford contained a broad arbitration
express
[made]
clause nor any other provision of the agreement
80
reference to class arbitration., Nevertheless, the arbitrator described
the arbitration clause as "much broader even than the usual broad
arbitration clause," and determined that it allowed for class arbitration."
The relevant arbitration clause provides as follows: "[n]o civil action
concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted
before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and
binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the American
82
Arbitration Association with one arbitrator."
Oxford conceded that the arbitrator "did articulate a contractual
basis for his decision to order class arbitration" but argued that the

78. Id. at 1077.
79. Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans L.L.C., 675 F.3d 215, 217 (3rd Cir. 2012), af'd, 133 S. Ct.
2064 (2013).
80. Id. at 217.
81. Id. at 217-18.
82. Id. at 223.
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arbitrator "exceeded his powers."83 The Third Circuit reasoned that
"Stolt-Nielsen does prohibit an arbitrator from inferring parties' consent
to class arbitration solely from their failure to preclude that procedure,
but the arbitrator did not draw the proscribed inference in this case.
Rather, the arbitrator construed the text of the arbitration agreement to
authorize and require class arbitration." 84 The defendant petitioned for
certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court.s Surprisingly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit decision in Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter.8 6 Based on this affirmation, the Supreme Court did
not intend to automatically prohibit classwide arbitration, and where an
arbitration agreement does not specifically forbid classwide litigation,
the mechanism remains available. In other words, the drafter of the
arbitration agreement will not receive the benefit of silence on the issue.
The United States District Court for Western District of
Washington also allowed class arbitration in Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum
L.P. 87 The plaintiffs in Hesse are former Sprint subscribers who filed
the lawsuit for Sprint's attempt to charge its customers for certain state
taxes. The case was certified as a class action in 2007.89 Sprint moved
for individual arbitration in 2011 relying on Concepcion.9 After some
discovery on the issue of arbitration was conducted, Sprint renewed its
Motion for Individual Arbitration in 2012.91 The Court granted Sprint's
Motion for Arbitration but left the issue of whether the parties' contract
allowed class arbitration or only individual arbitration to be decided by
the arbitrator. 92 The arbitrator later determined that the agreement was
broad enough to allow class arbitration.93 In deciding Sprint's Motion to
Vacate the Arbitrator's Determination, the Court followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, and allowed for

class arbitration.94
The Southern District of California denied a defendant's request for
relief from classwide arbitration in Saincome v. Truly Nolen of Am.,

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 224.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2064 (2013).
Sutter, 675 F.3d 215, a'd, 133 S. Ct. 2064.
Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., No. C06-0592JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 20, 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id
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Inc.95 In Saincome, the plaintiff brought a proposed collective action
lawsuit again the defendant for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").96 The plaintiff signed an arbitration
agreement whose relevant part reads as follows:
Any controversy, claim or dispute between a partner and Truly
Nolen of America (hereafter "TNA") ... will be resolved by

Binding Arbitration administered by the American Arbitration
Association (hereafter known as "AAA") .

. .

. The Arbitrator

may grant any remedy or relief that the Arbitrator deems just
and equitable, including any remedy that would have been
available if the matter had been heard in court . .9
The Saincome court differentiated its case from Concepcion and
Stolt-Nielsen, and allowed for collective arbitration, reasoning that an
agreement silent on collective litigation shouldn't be construed to forbid
it and, inter alia,that:
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-the provision of the FLSA under which
Plaintiff brings the instant suit as a class action-permits class
members to participate in the suit on an opt-in basis only,
eliminating what appears to be the Concepcion Court's primary
concern about the ability of an arbitrator to properly oversee a
class arbitration. 98
The Second Circuit has had difficulty digesting Concepcion. In
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., the plaintiffs filed a class action
antitrust suit against the charge-card issuer and the Southern District of
The
New York granted issuer's Motion to Compel Arbitration."
plaintiff merchants appealed and the Second Circuit reversed, finding
that the class-action waiver provision contained in the mandatory
arbitration clause in the card acceptance agreement was
unenforceable.100 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
0
reconsideration in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen.1 The Second
95. Saincome v. Truly Nolen of America, Inc., No. ll-CV-825-JM (BGS), 2011 WL
3420604, at *11-12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *12.
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013).
Id.

Id
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Circuit again reversed the district court, but placed a hold on the
mandate in order for the petitioner to writ of certiorari.10 2 While the
mandate was on hold, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Concepcion.'03 The Second Circuit again reversed the district court and
remanded with instruction, and consideration en banc was denied.' 04
Certiorari was granted.' 05 The Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit's decision and rejected the exception to the class arbitration
waiver that the Judge tried to establish, reaffirming Concepcion.06
State courts have diverged from Concepcion as well. In Baier v.
Darden Restaurants, the Missouri Court of Appeals invalidated an
arbitration agreement under Missouri law. 0 7 In Baier, the plaintiff
employee signed several documents in the beginning of her employment
with the defendant Darden, including an acknowledgment of the receipt
of a booklet describing Darden's Dispute Resolution Process
("DRP"). 08 The acknowledgement states that "I understand that the
company is equally bound to all of the provisions of the DRP."l 09 The
DRP provides:
The DRP is the sole means for resolving covered employmentrelated disputes, instead of court actions. Disputes eligible for
DRP must be resolved only through DRP, with the final step
being binding arbitration heard by an arbitrator. This means
DRP-eligible disputes will NOT BE RESOLVED BY A JUDGE
OR JURY. Neither the Company nor the Employee may bring
DRP-eligible disputes to court.
The Company and the
Employee waive all rights to bring a civil court action for these
disputes.'' 0
However, no one signed the acknowledgement on Darden's behalf,
and only had the plaintiffs signature."'
The Missouri Court of Appeals applied the Missouri law to
determine if a valid arbitration agreement existed. "The elements
102.

Id.

103.

Id.

104.

Id. at 2034, 2038.

105.
106.

Id.at 2034.
Id at 2312.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Baier v. Darden Rest., 420 S.W.3d 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 734-35.
Id.at735.
Id. at 734-35.
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required to form a valid contract in Missouri are 'offer, acceptance, and
bargained for consideration."" 1 2 Thus, under the Missouri law, the
defendant, in order to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement, had
to establish the offer, acceptance, and bargained for consideration.
Given the fact that the plaintiff signed the acknowledgement but Darden
did not, the Court of Appeals found that Darden failed to show its
"assent to abide by the terms of the agreement."ll 3
III. CONCLUSION

Concepcion is not a complete death toll to consumer rights as long
as industrious litigators and Courts find ways to depart from it, but the
applicability of Concepcion itself with carefully crafted and executed
arbitration agreements with class bans creates a serious blow to
consumer rights. Courts that choose to mindlessly follow Concepcion
without digging deep into the substance of the case will create a litany of
more zombielike opinions shortchanging effective global relief for
certain injustices and killing any relief for low dollar claims that are
forced into arbitration. The conscientious litigator should not mindlessly
assume that any arbitration clause must inherently be followed nor does
it dictate a ban on classwide relief. The cases have shown that where an
agreement is silent regarding a classwide ban, then the matter may
proceed as a class in arbitration. Agreements unsigned by the company
may not be agreements at all. If the company retains the right to
unilaterally alter the agreement without assent, it may be illusory and
unenforceable.
These exceptions or departures from Concepcion show plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' attorneys that they should not be deterred when they have
to face an arbitration agreement and argument.

112. Id at 737 (quoting Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo.
1988) (en banc).

113.

Id. at 738.
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